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# ------------------------------------------------------------------------
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# OWASP ModSecurity Core Rule Set ver.3.2.0
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# Copyright (c) 2006-2019 Trustwave and contributors. All rights reserved.
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#
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# The OWASP ModSecurity Core Rule Set is distributed under
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# Apache Software License (ASL) version 2
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# Please see the enclosed LICENSE file for full details.
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# ------------------------------------------------------------------------
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#
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# -- [[ Introduction ]] --------------------------------------------------------
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#
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# The OWASP ModSecurity Core Rule Set (CRS) is a set of generic attack
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# detection rules that provide a base level of protection for any web
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# application. They are written for the open source, cross-platform
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# ModSecurity Web Application Firewall.
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#
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# See also:
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# https://coreruleset.org/
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# https://github.com/SpiderLabs/owasp-modsecurity-crs
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# https://www.owasp.org/index.php/Category:OWASP_ModSecurity_Core_Rule_Set_Project
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#
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#
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# -- [[ System Requirements ]] -------------------------------------------------
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#
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# CRS requires ModSecurity version 2.8.0 or above.
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# We recommend to always use the newest ModSecurity version.
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#
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# The configuration directives/settings in this file are used to control
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# the OWASP ModSecurity CRS. These settings do **NOT** configure the main
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# ModSecurity settings (modsecurity.conf) such as SecRuleEngine,
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# SecRequestBodyAccess, SecAuditEngine, SecDebugLog, and XML processing.
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#
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# The CRS assumes that modsecurity.conf has been loaded. It is bundled with
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# ModSecurity. If you don't have it, you can get it from:
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# 2.x: https://raw.githubusercontent.com/SpiderLabs/ModSecurity/v2/master/modsecurity.conf-recommended
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# 3.x: https://raw.githubusercontent.com/SpiderLabs/ModSecurity/v3/master/modsecurity.conf-recommended
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#
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# The order of file inclusion in your webserver configuration should always be:
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# 1. modsecurity.conf
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# 2. crs-setup.conf (this file)
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# 3. rules/*.conf (the CRS rule files)
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#
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# Please refer to the INSTALL file for detailed installation instructions.
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#
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#
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# -- [[ Mode of Operation: Anomaly Scoring vs. Self-Contained ]] ---------------
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#
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# The CRS can run in two modes:
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#
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# -- [[ Anomaly Scoring Mode (default) ]] --
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# In CRS3, anomaly mode is the default and recommended mode, since it gives the
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# most accurate log information and offers the most flexibility in setting your
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# blocking policies. It is also called "collaborative detection mode".
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# In this mode, each matching rule increases an 'anomaly score'.
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# At the conclusion of the inbound rules, and again at the conclusion of the
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# outbound rules, the anomaly score is checked, and the blocking evaluation
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# rules apply a disruptive action, by default returning an error 403.
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#
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# -- [[ Self-Contained Mode ]] --
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# In this mode, rules apply an action instantly. This was the CRS2 default.
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# It can lower resource usage, at the cost of less flexibility in blocking policy
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# and less informative audit logs (only the first detected threat is logged).
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# Rules inherit the disruptive action that you specify (i.e. deny, drop, etc).
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# The first rule that matches will execute this action. In most cases this will
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# cause evaluation to stop after the first rule has matched, similar to how many
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# IDSs function.
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#
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# -- [[ Alert Logging Control ]] --
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# In the mode configuration, you must also adjust the desired logging options.
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# There are three common options for dealing with logging. By default CRS enables
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# logging to the webserver error log (or Event viewer) plus detailed logging to
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# the ModSecurity audit log (configured under SecAuditLog in modsecurity.conf).
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#
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# - To log to both error log and ModSecurity audit log file, use: "log,auditlog"
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# - To log *only* to the ModSecurity audit log file, use: "nolog,auditlog"
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# - To log *only* to the error log file, use: "log,noauditlog"
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#
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# Examples for the various modes follow.
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# You must leave one of the following options enabled.
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# Note that you must specify the same line for phase:1 and phase:2.
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#
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# Default: Anomaly Scoring mode, log to error log, log to ModSecurity audit log
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# - By default, offending requests are blocked with an error 403 response.
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# - To change the disruptive action, see RESPONSE-999-EXCEPTIONS.conf.example
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# and review section 'Changing the Disruptive Action for Anomaly Mode'.
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# - In Apache, you can use ErrorDocument to show a friendly error page or
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# perform a redirect: https://httpd.apache.org/docs/2.4/custom-error.html
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#
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SecDefaultAction "phase:1,log,auditlog,pass"
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SecDefaultAction "phase:2,log,auditlog,pass"
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# Example: Anomaly Scoring mode, log only to ModSecurity audit log
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# - By default, offending requests are blocked with an error 403 response.
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# - To change the disruptive action, see RESPONSE-999-EXCEPTIONS.conf.example
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# and review section 'Changing the Disruptive Action for Anomaly Mode'.
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# - In Apache, you can use ErrorDocument to show a friendly error page or
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# perform a redirect: https://httpd.apache.org/docs/2.4/custom-error.html
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#
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# SecDefaultAction "phase:1,nolog,auditlog,pass"
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# SecDefaultAction "phase:2,nolog,auditlog,pass"
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# Example: Self-contained mode, return error 403 on blocking
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# - In this configuration the default disruptive action becomes 'deny'. After a
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# rule triggers, it will stop processing the request and return an error 403.
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# - You can also use a different error status, such as 404, 406, et cetera.
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# - In Apache, you can use ErrorDocument to show a friendly error page or
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# perform a redirect: https://httpd.apache.org/docs/2.4/custom-error.html
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#
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# SecDefaultAction "phase:1,log,auditlog,deny,status:403"
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# SecDefaultAction "phase:2,log,auditlog,deny,status:403"
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# Example: Self-contained mode, redirect back to homepage on blocking
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# - In this configuration the 'tag' action includes the Host header data in the
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# log. This helps to identify which virtual host triggered the rule (if any).
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# - Note that this might cause redirect loops in some situations; for example
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# if a Cookie or User-Agent header is blocked, it will also be blocked when
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# the client subsequently tries to access the homepage. You can also redirect
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# to another custom URL.
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# SecDefaultAction "phase:1,log,auditlog,redirect:'http://%{request_headers.host}/',tag:'Host: %{request_headers.host}'"
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# SecDefaultAction "phase:2,log,auditlog,redirect:'http://%{request_headers.host}/',tag:'Host: %{request_headers.host}'"
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#
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# -- [[ Paranoia Level Initialization ]] ---------------------------------------
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#
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# The Paranoia Level (PL) setting allows you to choose the desired level
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# of rule checks that will add to your anomaly scores.
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#
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# With each paranoia level increase, the CRS enables additional rules
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# giving you a higher level of security. However, higher paranoia levels
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# also increase the possibility of blocking some legitimate traffic due to
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# false alarms (also named false positives or FPs). If you use higher
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# paranoia levels, it is likely that you will need to add some exclusion
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# rules for certain requests and applications receiving complex input.
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#
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# - A paranoia level of 1 is default. In this level, most core rules
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# are enabled. PL1 is advised for beginners, installations
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# covering many different sites and applications, and for setups
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# with standard security requirements.
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# At PL1 you should face FPs rarely. If you encounter FPs, please
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# open an issue on the CRS GitHub site and don't forget to attach your
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# complete Audit Log record for the request with the issue.
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# - Paranoia level 2 includes many extra rules, for instance enabling
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# many regexp-based SQL and XSS injection protections, and adding
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# extra keywords checked for code injections. PL2 is advised
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# for moderate to experienced users desiring more complete coverage
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# and for installations with elevated security requirements.
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# PL2 comes with some FPs which you need to handle.
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# - Paranoia level 3 enables more rules and keyword lists, and tweaks
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# limits on special characters used. PL3 is aimed at users experienced
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# at the handling of FPs and at installations with a high security
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# requirement.
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# - Paranoia level 4 further restricts special characters.
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# The highest level is advised for experienced users protecting
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# installations with very high security requirements. Running PL4 will
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# likely produce a very high number of FPs which have to be
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# treated before the site can go productive.
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#
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# All rules will log their PL to the audit log;
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# example: [tag "paranoia-level/2"]. This allows you to deduct from the
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# audit log how the WAF behavior is affected by paranoia level.
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#
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# It is important to also look into the variable
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# tx.enforce_bodyproc_urlencoded (Enforce Body Processor URLENCODED)
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# defined below. Enabling it closes a possible bypass of CRS.
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#
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# Uncomment this rule to change the default:
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#
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#SecAction \
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# "id:900000,\
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# phase:1,\
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# nolog,\
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# pass,\
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# t:none,\
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# setvar:tx.paranoia_level=1"
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# It is possible to execute rules from a higher paranoia level but not include
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# them in the anomaly scoring. This allows you to take a well-tuned system on
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# paranoia level 1 and add rules from paranoia level 2 without having to fear
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# the new rules would lead to false positives that raise your score above the
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# threshold.
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# This optional feature is enabled by uncommenting the following rule and
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# setting the tx.executing_paranoia_level.
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# Technically, rules up to the level defined in tx.executing_paranoia_level
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# will be executed, but only the rules up to tx.paranoia_level affect the
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# anomaly scores.
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# By default, tx.executing_paranoia_level is set to tx.paranoia_level.
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# tx.executing_paranoia_level must not be lower than tx.paranoia_level.
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#
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# Please notice that setting tx.executing_paranoia_level to a higher paranoia
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# level results in a performance impact that is equally high as setting
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# tx.paranoia_level to said level.
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#
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#SecAction \
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# "id:900001,\
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# phase:1,\
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# nolog,\
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# pass,\
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# t:none,\
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# setvar:tx.executing_paranoia_level=1"
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#
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# -- [[ Enforce Body Processor URLENCODED ]] -----------------------------------
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#
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# ModSecurity selects the body processor based on the Content-Type request
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# header. But clients are not always setting the Content-Type header for their
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# request body payloads. This will leave ModSecurity with limited vision into
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# the payload. The variable tx.enforce_bodyproc_urlencoded lets you force the
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# URLENCODED body processor in these situations. This is off by default, as it
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# implies a change of the behaviour of ModSecurity beyond CRS (the body
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# processor applies to all rules, not only CRS) and because it may lead to
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# false positives already on paranoia level 1. However, enabling this variable
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# closes a possible bypass of CRS so it should be considered.
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#
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# Uncomment this rule to change the default:
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#
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#SecAction \
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# "id:900010,\
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# phase:1,\
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# nolog,\
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# pass,\
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# t:none,\
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# setvar:tx.enforce_bodyproc_urlencoded=1"
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#
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# -- [[ Anomaly Mode Severity Levels ]] ----------------------------------------
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#
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# Each rule in the CRS has an associated severity level.
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# These are the default scoring points for each severity level.
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# These settings will be used to increment the anomaly score if a rule matches.
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# You may adjust these points to your liking, but this is usually not needed.
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#
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# - CRITICAL severity: Anomaly Score of 5.
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# Mostly generated by the application attack rules (93x and 94x files).
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# - ERROR severity: Anomaly Score of 4.
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# Generated mostly from outbound leakage rules (95x files).
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# - WARNING severity: Anomaly Score of 3.
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# Generated mostly by malicious client rules (91x files).
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# - NOTICE severity: Anomaly Score of 2.
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# Generated mostly by the protocol rules (92x files).
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#
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# In anomaly mode, these scores are cumulative.
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# So it's possible for a request to hit multiple rules.
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#
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# (Note: In this file, we use 'phase:1' to set CRS configuration variables.
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# In general, 'phase:request' is used. However, we want to make absolutely sure
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# that all configuration variables are set before the CRS rules are processed.)
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#
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#SecAction \
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# "id:900100,\
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# phase:1,\
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# nolog,\
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# pass,\
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# t:none,\
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# setvar:tx.critical_anomaly_score=5,\
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# setvar:tx.error_anomaly_score=4,\
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# setvar:tx.warning_anomaly_score=3,\
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# setvar:tx.notice_anomaly_score=2"
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#
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# -- [[ Anomaly Mode Blocking Threshold Levels ]] ------------------------------
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#
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# Here, you can specify at which cumulative anomaly score an inbound request,
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# or outbound response, gets blocked.
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#
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# Most detected inbound threats will give a critical score of 5.
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# Smaller violations, like violations of protocol/standards, carry lower scores.
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#
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# [ At default value ]
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# If you keep the blocking thresholds at the defaults, the CRS will work
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# similarly to previous CRS versions: a single critical rule match will cause
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# the request to be blocked and logged.
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#
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# [ Using higher values ]
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# If you want to make the CRS less sensitive, you can increase the blocking
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# thresholds, for instance to 7 (which would require multiple rule matches
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# before blocking) or 10 (which would require at least two critical alerts - or
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# a combination of many lesser alerts), or even higher. However, increasing the
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# thresholds might cause some attacks to bypass the CRS rules or your policies.
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#
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# [ New deployment strategy: Starting high and decreasing ]
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# It is a common practice to start a fresh CRS installation with elevated
|
|
|
|
|
# anomaly scoring thresholds (>100) and then lower the limits as your
|
|
|
|
|
# confidence in the setup grows. You may also look into the Sampling
|
|
|
|
|
# Percentage section below for a different strategy to ease into a new
|
|
|
|
|
# CRS installation.
|
|
|
|
|
#
|
|
|
|
|
# [ Anomaly Threshold / Paranoia Level Quadrant ]
|
|
|
|
|
#
|
|
|
|
|
# High Anomaly Limit | High Anomaly Limit
|
|
|
|
|
# Low Paranoia Level | High Paranoia Level
|
|
|
|
|
# -> Fresh Site | -> Experimental Site
|
|
|
|
|
# ------------------------------------------------------
|
|
|
|
|
# Low Anomaly Limit | Low Anomaly Limit
|
|
|
|
|
# Low Paranoia Level | High Paranoia Level
|
|
|
|
|
# -> Standard Site | -> High Security Site
|
|
|
|
|
#
|
|
|
|
|
# Uncomment this rule to change the defaults:
|
|
|
|
|
#
|
|
|
|
|
#SecAction \
|
|
|
|
|
# "id:900110,\
|
|
|
|
|
# phase:1,\
|
|
|
|
|
# nolog,\
|
|
|
|
|
# pass,\
|
|
|
|
|
# t:none,\
|
|
|
|
|
# setvar:tx.inbound_anomaly_score_threshold=5,\
|
|
|
|
|
# setvar:tx.outbound_anomaly_score_threshold=4"
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
#
|
|
|
|
|
# -- [[ Application Specific Rule Exclusions ]] ----------------------------------------
|
|
|
|
|
#
|
|
|
|
|
# Some well-known applications may undertake actions that appear to be
|
|
|
|
|
# malicious. This includes actions such as allowing HTML or Javascript within
|
|
|
|
|
# parameters. In such cases the CRS aims to prevent false positives by allowing
|
|
|
|
|
# administrators to enable prebuilt, application specific exclusions on an
|
|
|
|
|
# application by application basis.
|
|
|
|
|
# These application specific exclusions are distinct from the rules that would
|
|
|
|
|
# be placed in the REQUEST-900-EXCLUSION-RULES-BEFORE-CRS configuration file as
|
|
|
|
|
# they are prebuilt for specific applications. The 'REQUEST-900' file is
|
|
|
|
|
# designed for users to add their own custom exclusions. Note, using these
|
|
|
|
|
# application specific exclusions may loosen restrictions of the CRS,
|
|
|
|
|
# especially if used with an application they weren't designed for. As a result
|
|
|
|
|
# they should be applied with care.
|
|
|
|
|
# To use this functionality you must specify a supported application. To do so
|
|
|
|
|
# uncomment rule 900130. In addition to uncommenting the rule you will need to
|
|
|
|
|
# specify which application(s) you'd like to enable exclusions for. Only a
|
|
|
|
|
# (very) limited set of applications are currently supported, please use the
|
|
|
|
|
# filenames prefixed with 'REQUEST-903' to guide you in your selection.
|
|
|
|
|
# Such filenames use the following convention:
|
|
|
|
|
# REQUEST-903.9XXX-{APPNAME}-EXCLUSIONS-RULES.conf
|
|
|
|
|
#
|
|
|
|
|
# It is recommended if you run multiple web applications on your site to limit
|
|
|
|
|
# the effects of the exclusion to only the path where the excluded webapp
|
|
|
|
|
# resides using a rule similar to the following example:
|
|
|
|
|
# SecRule REQUEST_URI "@beginsWith /wordpress/" setvar:tx.crs_exclusions_wordpress=1
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
#
|
|
|
|
|
# Modify and uncomment this rule to select which application:
|
|
|
|
|
#
|
|
|
|
|
SecAction \
|
|
|
|
|
"id:900130,\
|
|
|
|
|
phase:1,\
|
|
|
|
|
nolog,\
|
|
|
|
|
pass,\
|
|
|
|
|
t:none,\
|
|
|
|
|
setvar:tx.crs_exclusions_nextcloud=1,\
|
|
|
|
|
setvar:tx.crs_exclusions_wordpress=1"
|
|
|
|
|
# setvar:tx.crs_exclusions_cpanel=1,\
|
|
|
|
|
# setvar:tx.crs_exclusions_drupal=1,\
|
|
|
|
|
# setvar:tx.crs_exclusions_dokuwiki=1,\
|
|
|
|
|
# setvar:tx.crs_exclusions_xenforo=1"
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
#
|
|
|
|
|
# -- [[ HTTP Policy Settings ]] ------------------------------------------------
|
|
|
|
|
#
|
|
|
|
|
# This section defines your policies for the HTTP protocol, such as:
|
|
|
|
|
# - allowed HTTP versions, HTTP methods, allowed request Content-Types
|
|
|
|
|
# - forbidden file extensions (e.g. .bak, .sql) and request headers (e.g. Proxy)
|
|
|
|
|
#
|
|
|
|
|
# These variables are used in the following rule files:
|
|
|
|
|
# - REQUEST-911-METHOD-ENFORCEMENT.conf
|
|
|
|
|
# - REQUEST-912-DOS-PROTECTION.conf
|
|
|
|
|
# - REQUEST-920-PROTOCOL-ENFORCEMENT.conf
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
# HTTP methods that a client is allowed to use.
|
|
|
|
|
# Default: GET HEAD POST OPTIONS
|
|
|
|
|
# Example: for RESTful APIs, add the following methods: PUT PATCH DELETE
|
|
|
|
|
# Example: for WebDAV, add the following methods: CHECKOUT COPY DELETE LOCK
|
|
|
|
|
# MERGE MKACTIVITY MKCOL MOVE PROPFIND PROPPATCH PUT UNLOCK
|
|
|
|
|
# Uncomment this rule to change the default.
|
|
|
|
|
#SecAction \
|
|
|
|
|
# "id:900200,\
|
|
|
|
|
# phase:1,\
|
|
|
|
|
# nolog,\
|
|
|
|
|
# pass,\
|
|
|
|
|
# t:none,\
|
|
|
|
|
# setvar:'tx.allowed_methods=GET HEAD POST OPTIONS'"
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
# Content-Types that a client is allowed to send in a request.
|
|
|
|
|
# Default: |application/x-www-form-urlencoded| |multipart/form-data| |multipart/related|
|
|
|
|
|
# |text/xml| |application/xml| |application/soap+xml| |application/x-amf| |application/json|
|
|
|
|
|
# |application/octet-stream| |application/csp-report| |application/xss-auditor-report| |text/plain|
|
|
|
|
|
# Uncomment this rule to change the default.
|
|
|
|
|
#SecAction \
|
|
|
|
|
# "id:900220,\
|
|
|
|
|
# phase:1,\
|
|
|
|
|
# nolog,\
|
|
|
|
|
# pass,\
|
|
|
|
|
# t:none,\
|
|
|
|
|
# setvar:'tx.allowed_request_content_type=|application/x-www-form-urlencoded| |multipart/form-data| |multipart/related| |text/xml| |application/xml| |application/soap+xml| |application/x-amf| |application/json| |application/octet-stream| |application/csp-report| |application/xss-auditor-report| |text/plain|'"
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
# Allowed HTTP versions.
|
|
|
|
|
# Default: HTTP/1.0 HTTP/1.1 HTTP/2 HTTP/2.0
|
|
|
|
|
# Example for legacy clients: HTTP/0.9 HTTP/1.0 HTTP/1.1 HTTP/2 HTTP/2.0
|
|
|
|
|
# Note that some web server versions use 'HTTP/2', some 'HTTP/2.0', so
|
|
|
|
|
# we include both version strings by default.
|
|
|
|
|
# Uncomment this rule to change the default.
|
|
|
|
|
#SecAction \
|
|
|
|
|
# "id:900230,\
|
|
|
|
|
# phase:1,\
|
|
|
|
|
# nolog,\
|
|
|
|
|
# pass,\
|
|
|
|
|
# t:none,\
|
|
|
|
|
# setvar:'tx.allowed_http_versions=HTTP/1.0 HTTP/1.1 HTTP/2 HTTP/2.0'"
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
# Forbidden file extensions.
|
|
|
|
|
# Guards against unintended exposure of development/configuration files.
|
|
|
|
|
# Default: .asa/ .asax/ .ascx/ .axd/ .backup/ .bak/ .bat/ .cdx/ .cer/ .cfg/ .cmd/ .com/ .config/ .conf/ .cs/ .csproj/ .csr/ .dat/ .db/ .dbf/ .dll/ .dos/ .htr/ .htw/ .ida/ .idc/ .idq/ .inc/ .ini/ .key/ .licx/ .lnk/ .log/ .mdb/ .old/ .pass/ .pdb/ .pol/ .printer/ .pwd/ .rdb/ .resources/ .resx/ .sql/ .swp/ .sys/ .vb/ .vbs/ .vbproj/ .vsdisco/ .webinfo/ .xsd/ .xsx/
|
|
|
|
|
# Example: .bak/ .config/ .conf/ .db/ .ini/ .log/ .old/ .pass/ .pdb/ .rdb/ .sql/
|
|
|
|
|
# Uncomment this rule to change the default.
|
|
|
|
|
#SecAction \
|
|
|
|
|
# "id:900240,\
|
|
|
|
|
# phase:1,\
|
|
|
|
|
# nolog,\
|
|
|
|
|
# pass,\
|
|
|
|
|
# t:none,\
|
|
|
|
|
# setvar:'tx.restricted_extensions=.asa/ .asax/ .ascx/ .axd/ .backup/ .bak/ .bat/ .cdx/ .cer/ .cfg/ .cmd/ .com/ .config/ .conf/ .cs/ .csproj/ .csr/ .dat/ .db/ .dbf/ .dll/ .dos/ .htr/ .htw/ .ida/ .idc/ .idq/ .inc/ .ini/ .key/ .licx/ .lnk/ .log/ .mdb/ .old/ .pass/ .pdb/ .pol/ .printer/ .pwd/ .rdb/ .resources/ .resx/ .sql/ .swp/ .sys/ .vb/ .vbs/ .vbproj/ .vsdisco/ .webinfo/ .xsd/ .xsx/'"
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
# Forbidden request headers.
|
|
|
|
|
# Header names should be lowercase, enclosed by /slashes/ as delimiters.
|
|
|
|
|
# Blocking Proxy header prevents 'httpoxy' vulnerability: https://httpoxy.org
|
|
|
|
|
# Default: /proxy/ /lock-token/ /content-range/ /if/
|
|
|
|
|
# Uncomment this rule to change the default.
|
|
|
|
|
#SecAction \
|
|
|
|
|
# "id:900250,\
|
|
|
|
|
# phase:1,\
|
|
|
|
|
# nolog,\
|
|
|
|
|
# pass,\
|
|
|
|
|
# t:none,\
|
|
|
|
|
# setvar:'tx.restricted_headers=/proxy/ /lock-token/ /content-range/ /if/'"
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
# File extensions considered static files.
|
|
|
|
|
# Extensions include the dot, lowercase, enclosed by /slashes/ as delimiters.
|
|
|
|
|
# Used in DoS protection rule. See section "Anti-Automation / DoS Protection".
|
|
|
|
|
# Default: /.jpg/ /.jpeg/ /.png/ /.gif/ /.js/ /.css/ /.ico/ /.svg/ /.webp/
|
|
|
|
|
# Uncomment this rule to change the default.
|
|
|
|
|
#SecAction \
|
|
|
|
|
# "id:900260,\
|
|
|
|
|
# phase:1,\
|
|
|
|
|
# nolog,\
|
|
|
|
|
# pass,\
|
|
|
|
|
# t:none,\
|
|
|
|
|
# setvar:'tx.static_extensions=/.jpg/ /.jpeg/ /.png/ /.gif/ /.js/ /.css/ /.ico/ /.svg/ /.webp/'"
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
# Content-Types charsets that a client is allowed to send in a request.
|
|
|
|
|
# Default: utf-8|iso-8859-1|iso-8859-15|windows-1252
|
|
|
|
|
# Uncomment this rule to change the default.
|
|
|
|
|
# Use "|" to separate multiple charsets like in the rule defining
|
|
|
|
|
# tx.allowed_request_content_type.
|
|
|
|
|
#SecAction \
|
|
|
|
|
# "id:900280,\
|
|
|
|
|
# phase:1,\
|
|
|
|
|
# nolog,\
|
|
|
|
|
# pass,\
|
|
|
|
|
# t:none,\
|
|
|
|
|
# setvar:'tx.allowed_request_content_type_charset=utf-8|iso-8859-1|iso-8859-15|windows-1252'"
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
#
|
|
|
|
|
# -- [[ HTTP Argument/Upload Limits ]] -----------------------------------------
|
|
|
|
|
#
|
|
|
|
|
# Here you can define optional limits on HTTP get/post parameters and uploads.
|
|
|
|
|
# This can help to prevent application specific DoS attacks.
|
|
|
|
|
#
|
|
|
|
|
# These values are checked in REQUEST-920-PROTOCOL-ENFORCEMENT.conf.
|
|
|
|
|
# Beware of blocking legitimate traffic when enabling these limits.
|
|
|
|
|
#
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
# Block request if number of arguments is too high
|
|
|
|
|
# Default: unlimited
|
|
|
|
|
# Example: 255
|
|
|
|
|
# Uncomment this rule to set a limit.
|
|
|
|
|
#SecAction \
|
|
|
|
|
# "id:900300,\
|
|
|
|
|
# phase:1,\
|
|
|
|
|
# nolog,\
|
|
|
|
|
# pass,\
|
|
|
|
|
# t:none,\
|
|
|
|
|
# setvar:tx.max_num_args=255"
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
# Block request if the length of any argument name is too high
|
|
|
|
|
# Default: unlimited
|
|
|
|
|
# Example: 100
|
|
|
|
|
# Uncomment this rule to set a limit.
|
|
|
|
|
#SecAction \
|
|
|
|
|
# "id:900310,\
|
|
|
|
|
# phase:1,\
|
|
|
|
|
# nolog,\
|
|
|
|
|
# pass,\
|
|
|
|
|
# t:none,\
|
|
|
|
|
# setvar:tx.arg_name_length=100"
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
# Block request if the length of any argument value is too high
|
|
|
|
|
# Default: unlimited
|
|
|
|
|
# Example: 400
|
|
|
|
|
# Uncomment this rule to set a limit.
|
|
|
|
|
#SecAction \
|
|
|
|
|
# "id:900320,\
|
|
|
|
|
# phase:1,\
|
|
|
|
|
# nolog,\
|
|
|
|
|
# pass,\
|
|
|
|
|
# t:none,\
|
|
|
|
|
# setvar:tx.arg_length=400"
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
# Block request if the total length of all combined arguments is too high
|
|
|
|
|
# Default: unlimited
|
|
|
|
|
# Example: 64000
|
|
|
|
|
# Uncomment this rule to set a limit.
|
|
|
|
|
#SecAction \
|
|
|
|
|
# "id:900330,\
|
|
|
|
|
# phase:1,\
|
|
|
|
|
# nolog,\
|
|
|
|
|
# pass,\
|
|
|
|
|
# t:none,\
|
|
|
|
|
# setvar:tx.total_arg_length=64000"
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
# Block request if the file size of any individual uploaded file is too high
|
|
|
|
|
# Default: unlimited
|
|
|
|
|
# Example: 1048576
|
|
|
|
|
# Uncomment this rule to set a limit.
|
|
|
|
|
#SecAction \
|
|
|
|
|
# "id:900340,\
|
|
|
|
|
# phase:1,\
|
|
|
|
|
# nolog,\
|
|
|
|
|
# pass,\
|
|
|
|
|
# t:none,\
|
|
|
|
|
# setvar:tx.max_file_size=1048576"
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
# Block request if the total size of all combined uploaded files is too high
|
|
|
|
|
# Default: unlimited
|
|
|
|
|
# Example: 1048576
|
|
|
|
|
# Uncomment this rule to set a limit.
|
|
|
|
|
#SecAction \
|
|
|
|
|
# "id:900350,\
|
|
|
|
|
# phase:1,\
|
|
|
|
|
# nolog,\
|
|
|
|
|
# pass,\
|
|
|
|
|
# t:none,\
|
|
|
|
|
# setvar:tx.combined_file_sizes=1048576"
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
#
|
|
|
|
|
# -- [[ Easing In / Sampling Percentage ]] -------------------------------------
|
|
|
|
|
#
|
|
|
|
|
# Adding the Core Rule Set to an existing productive site can lead to false
|
|
|
|
|
# positives, unexpected performance issues and other undesired side effects.
|
|
|
|
|
#
|
|
|
|
|
# It can be beneficial to test the water first by enabling the CRS for a
|
|
|
|
|
# limited number of requests only and then, when you have solved the issues (if
|
|
|
|
|
# any) and you have confidence in the setup, to raise the ratio of requests
|
|
|
|
|
# being sent into the ruleset.
|
|
|
|
|
#
|
|
|
|
|
# Adjust the percentage of requests that are funnelled into the Core Rules by
|
|
|
|
|
# setting TX.sampling_percentage below. The default is 100, meaning that every
|
|
|
|
|
# request gets checked by the CRS. The selection of requests, which are going
|
|
|
|
|
# to be checked, is based on a pseudo random number generated by ModSecurity.
|
|
|
|
|
#
|
|
|
|
|
# If a request is allowed to pass without being checked by the CRS, there is no
|
|
|
|
|
# entry in the audit log (for performance reasons), but an error log entry is
|
|
|
|
|
# written. If you want to disable the error log entry, then issue the
|
|
|
|
|
# following directive somewhere after the inclusion of the CRS
|
|
|
|
|
# (E.g., RESPONSE-999-EXCEPTIONS.conf).
|
|
|
|
|
#
|
|
|
|
|
# SecRuleUpdateActionById 901150 "nolog"
|
|
|
|
|
#
|
|
|
|
|
# ATTENTION: If this TX.sampling_percentage is below 100, then some of the
|
|
|
|
|
# requests will bypass the Core Rules completely and you lose the ability to
|
|
|
|
|
# protect your service with ModSecurity.
|
|
|
|
|
#
|
|
|
|
|
# Uncomment this rule to enable this feature:
|
|
|
|
|
#
|
|
|
|
|
#SecAction "id:900400,\
|
|
|
|
|
# phase:1,\
|
|
|
|
|
# pass,\
|
|
|
|
|
# nolog,\
|
|
|
|
|
# setvar:tx.sampling_percentage=100"
|
|
|
|
|
|
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#
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# -- [[ Project Honey Pot HTTP Blacklist ]] ------------------------------------
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#
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# Optionally, you can check the client IP address against the Project Honey Pot
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# HTTPBL (dnsbl.httpbl.org). In order to use this, you need to register to get a
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# free API key. Set it here with SecHttpBlKey.
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#
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# Project Honeypot returns multiple different malicious IP types.
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# You may specify which you want to block by enabling or disabling them below.
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#
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# Ref: https://www.projecthoneypot.org/httpbl.php
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# Ref: https://github.com/SpiderLabs/ModSecurity/wiki/Reference-Manual#wiki-SecHttpBlKey
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#
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# Uncomment these rules to use this feature:
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#
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#SecHttpBlKey XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
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#SecAction "id:900500,\
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# phase:1,\
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# nolog,\
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# pass,\
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# t:none,\
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# setvar:tx.block_search_ip=1,\
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# setvar:tx.block_suspicious_ip=1,\
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# setvar:tx.block_harvester_ip=1,\
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# setvar:tx.block_spammer_ip=1"
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#
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# -- [[ GeoIP Database ]] ------------------------------------------------------
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#
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# There are some rulesets that inspect geolocation data of the client IP address
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# (geoLookup). The CRS uses geoLookup to implement optional country blocking.
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#
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# To use geolocation, we make use of the MaxMind GeoIP database.
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# This database is not included with the CRS and must be downloaded.
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#
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# There are two formats for the GeoIP database. ModSecurity v2 uses GeoLite (.dat files),
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# and ModSecurity v3 uses GeoLite2 (.mmdb files).
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#
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# If you use ModSecurity 3, MaxMind provides a binary for updating GeoLite2 files,
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# see https://github.com/maxmind/geoipupdate.
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#
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# Download the package for your OS, and read https://dev.maxmind.com/geoip/geoipupdate/
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# for configuration options.
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#
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# Warning: GeoLite (not GeoLite2) databases are considered legacy, and not being updated anymore.
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# See https://support.maxmind.com/geolite-legacy-discontinuation-notice/ for more info.
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#
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# Therefore, if you use ModSecurity v2, you need to regenerate updated .dat files
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# from CSV files first.
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#
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# You can achieve this using https://github.com/sherpya/geolite2legacy
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# Pick the zip files from maxmind site:
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# https://geolite.maxmind.com/download/geoip/database/GeoLite2-Country-CSV.zip
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#
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# Follow the guidelines for installing the tool and run:
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# ./geolite2legacy.py -i GeoLite2-Country-CSV.zip \
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# -f geoname2fips.csv -o /usr/share/GeoliteCountry.dat
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#
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# Update the database regularly, see Step 3 of the configuration link above.
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#
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# By default, when you execute `sudo geoipupdate` on Linux, files from the free database
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# will be downloaded to `/usr/share/GeoIP` (both v1 and v2).
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#
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# Then choose from:
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# - `GeoLite2-Country.mmdb` (if you are using ModSecurity v3)
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# - `GeoLiteCountry.dat` (if you are using ModSecurity v2)
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#
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# Ref: http://blog.spiderlabs.com/2010/10/detecting-malice-with-modsecurity-geolocation-data.html
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# Ref: http://blog.spiderlabs.com/2010/11/detecting-malice-with-modsecurity-ip-forensics.html
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#
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# Uncomment only one of the next rules here to use this feature.
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# Choose the one depending on the ModSecurity version you are using, and change the path accordingly:
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#
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# For ModSecurity v3:
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#SecGeoLookupDB /usr/share/GeoIP/GeoLite2-Country.mmdb
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# For ModSecurity v2 (points to the converted one):
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#SecGeoLookupDB /usr/share/GeoIP/GeoLiteCountry.dat
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#
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# -=[ Block Countries ]=-
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#
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# Rules in the IP Reputation file can check the client against a list of high
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# risk country codes. These countries have to be defined in the variable
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# tx.high_risk_country_codes via their ISO 3166 two-letter country code:
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# https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ISO_3166-1_alpha-2#Officially_assigned_code_elements
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#
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# If you are sure that you are not getting any legitimate requests from a given
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# country, then you can disable all access from that country via this variable.
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# The rule performing the test has the rule id 910100.
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#
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# This rule requires SecGeoLookupDB to be enabled and the GeoIP database to be
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# downloaded (see the section "GeoIP Database" above.)
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#
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# By default, the list is empty. A list used by some sites was the following:
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# setvar:'tx.high_risk_country_codes=UA ID YU LT EG RO BG TR RU PK MY CN'"
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#
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# Uncomment this rule to use this feature:
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#
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#SecAction \
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# "id:900600,\
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# phase:1,\
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# nolog,\
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# pass,\
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# t:none,\
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# setvar:'tx.high_risk_country_codes='"
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#
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# -- [[ Anti-Automation / DoS Protection ]] ------------------------------------
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#
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# Optional DoS protection against clients making requests too quickly.
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#
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# When a client is making more than 100 requests (excluding static files) within
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# 60 seconds, this is considered a 'burst'. After two bursts, the client is
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# blocked for 600 seconds.
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#
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# Requests to static files are not counted towards DoS; they are listed in the
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# 'tx.static_extensions' setting, which you can change in this file (see
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# section "HTTP Policy Settings").
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#
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# For a detailed description, see rule file REQUEST-912-DOS-PROTECTION.conf.
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#
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|
# Uncomment this rule to use this feature:
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#
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#SecAction \
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# "id:900700,\
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# phase:1,\
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# nolog,\
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# pass,\
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# t:none,\
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# setvar:'tx.dos_burst_time_slice=60',\
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# setvar:'tx.dos_counter_threshold=100',\
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# setvar:'tx.dos_block_timeout=600'"
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#
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# -- [[ Check UTF-8 encoding ]] ------------------------------------------------
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#
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# The CRS can optionally check request contents for invalid UTF-8 encoding.
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# We only want to apply this check if UTF-8 encoding is actually used by the
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# site; otherwise it will result in false positives.
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#
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# Uncomment this rule to use this feature:
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#
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#SecAction \
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# "id:900950,\
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# phase:1,\
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# nolog,\
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# pass,\
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# t:none,\
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# setvar:tx.crs_validate_utf8_encoding=1"
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#
|
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# -- [[ Blocking Based on IP Reputation ]] ------------------------------------
|
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#
|
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|
# Blocking based on reputation is permanent in the CRS. Unlike other rules,
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# which look at the individual request, the blocking of IPs is based on
|
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# a persistent record in the IP collection, which remains active for a
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# certain amount of time.
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#
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# There are two ways an individual client can become flagged for blocking:
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# - External information (RBL, GeoIP, etc.)
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# - Internal information (Core Rules)
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#
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|
# The record in the IP collection carries a flag, which tags requests from
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|
# individual clients with a flag named IP.reput_block_flag.
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|
# But the flag alone is not enough to have a client blocked. There is also
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# a global switch named tx.do_reput_block. This is off by default. If you set
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# it to 1 (=On), requests from clients with the IP.reput_block_flag will
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# be blocked for a certain duration.
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#
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|
|
# Variables
|
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|
|
# ip.reput_block_flag Blocking flag for the IP collection record
|
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|
|
# ip.reput_block_reason Reason (= rule message) that caused to blocking flag
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|
|
# tx.do_reput_block Switch deciding if we really block based on flag
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|
|
# tx.reput_block_duration Setting to define the duration of a block
|
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|
#
|
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|
|
# It may be important to know, that all the other core rules are skipped for
|
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# requests, when it is clear that they carry the blocking flag in question.
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|
#
|
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|
|
|
# Uncomment this rule to use this feature:
|
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|
|
#
|
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|
|
#SecAction \
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|
|
# "id:900960,\
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|
|
# phase:1,\
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|
# nolog,\
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|
# pass,\
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|
# t:none,\
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|
|
# setvar:tx.do_reput_block=1"
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#
|
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|
|
# Uncomment this rule to change the blocking time:
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|
# Default: 300 (5 minutes)
|
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|
|
#
|
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|
|
#SecAction \
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|
|
# "id:900970,\
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|
|
# phase:1,\
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|
# nolog,\
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# pass,\
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|
# t:none,\
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|
|
# setvar:tx.reput_block_duration=300"
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#
|
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|
|
# -- [[ Collection timeout ]] --------------------------------------------------
|
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|
#
|
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|
|
# Set the SecCollectionTimeout directive from the ModSecurity default (1 hour)
|
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|
# to a lower setting which is appropriate to most sites.
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|
|
# This increases performance by cleaning out stale collection (block) entries.
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|
#
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|
# This value should be greater than or equal to:
|
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|
|
# tx.reput_block_duration (see section "Blocking Based on IP Reputation") and
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|
|
# tx.dos_block_timeout (see section "Anti-Automation / DoS Protection").
|
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|
|
#
|
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|
|
# Ref: https://github.com/SpiderLabs/ModSecurity/wiki/Reference-Manual#wiki-SecCollectionTimeout
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|
# Please keep this directive uncommented.
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|
# Default: 600 (10 minutes)
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|
SecCollectionTimeout 600
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#
|
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|
# -- [[ End of setup ]] --------------------------------------------------------
|
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|
#
|
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|
|
# The CRS checks the tx.crs_setup_version variable to ensure that the setup
|
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|
|
# has been loaded. If you are not planning to use this setup template,
|
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|
|
|
# you must manually set the tx.crs_setup_version variable before including
|
|
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|
|
# the CRS rules/* files.
|
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|
|
#
|
|
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|
|
# The variable is a numerical representation of the CRS version number.
|
|
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|
|
# E.g., v3.0.0 is represented as 300.
|
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|
|
#
|
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|
|
SecAction \
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|
|
"id:900990,\
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|
phase:1,\
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nolog,\
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pass,\
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t:none,\
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|
|
setvar:tx.crs_setup_version=320"
|
Manuel Caballero
Evilham