diff --git a/dd-waf/README.md b/dd-waf/README.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..e69de29
diff --git a/dd-waf/docker/modsecurity/000-default.conf b/dd-waf/docker/modsecurity/000-default.conf
index d6fc48a..851b74c 100644
--- a/dd-waf/docker/modsecurity/000-default.conf
+++ b/dd-waf/docker/modsecurity/000-default.conf
@@ -3,8 +3,11 @@
 	modsecurity_rules_file /etc/apache2/modsecurity.d/modsec_rules.conf 
 	ServerAdmin webmaster@localhost
 	DocumentRoot /var/www/html
-	ErrorLog ${APACHE_LOG_DIR}/error.log
-	CustomLog ${APACHE_LOG_DIR}/access.log combined
+	#ErrorLog ${APACHE_LOG_DIR}/error.log
+	#CustomLog ${APACHE_LOG_DIR}/access.log combined
+  ErrorLog /dev/stderr
+  TransferLog /dev/stdout
+
 
 	ProxyPreserveHost On
   ProxyRequests off
diff --git a/dd-waf/docker/modsecurity/Dockerfile b/dd-waf/docker/modsecurity/Dockerfile
index 0276f51..aa79389 100644
--- a/dd-waf/docker/modsecurity/Dockerfile
+++ b/dd-waf/docker/modsecurity/Dockerfile
@@ -44,7 +44,7 @@ ADD modsec_rules.conf /etc/apache2/modsecurity.d/
 
 # Install OWASP ModSecurity Core Rule Set (CRS) on Ubuntu
 RUN git clone https://github.com/SpiderLabs/owasp-modsecurity-crs.git /etc/apache2/modsecurity.d/owasp-crs && \
-	cp /etc/apache2/modsecurity.d/owasp-crs/crs-setup.conf.example /etc/apache2/modsecurity.d/owasp-crs/crs-setup.conf
+	cp /crs-setup.conf /etc/apache2/modsecurity.d/owasp-crs/crs-setup.conf
 
 # Activate ModSecurity
 RUN mv /etc/apache2/sites-available/000-default.conf /etc/apache2/sites-available/000-default.conf.old
diff --git a/dd-waf/docker/modsecurity/crs-setup.conf b/dd-waf/docker/modsecurity/crs-setup.conf
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..fb455ec
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dd-waf/docker/modsecurity/crs-setup.conf
@@ -0,0 +1,828 @@
+# ------------------------------------------------------------------------
+# OWASP ModSecurity Core Rule Set ver.3.2.0
+# Copyright (c) 2006-2019 Trustwave and contributors. All rights reserved.
+#
+# The OWASP ModSecurity Core Rule Set is distributed under
+# Apache Software License (ASL) version 2
+# Please see the enclosed LICENSE file for full details.
+# ------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+
+#
+# -- [[ Introduction ]] --------------------------------------------------------
+#
+# The OWASP ModSecurity Core Rule Set (CRS) is a set of generic attack
+# detection rules that provide a base level of protection for any web
+# application. They are written for the open source, cross-platform
+# ModSecurity Web Application Firewall.
+#
+# See also:
+# https://coreruleset.org/
+# https://github.com/SpiderLabs/owasp-modsecurity-crs
+# https://www.owasp.org/index.php/Category:OWASP_ModSecurity_Core_Rule_Set_Project
+#
+
+
+#
+# -- [[ System Requirements ]] -------------------------------------------------
+#
+# CRS requires ModSecurity version 2.8.0 or above.
+# We recommend to always use the newest ModSecurity version.
+#
+# The configuration directives/settings in this file are used to control
+# the OWASP ModSecurity CRS. These settings do **NOT** configure the main
+# ModSecurity settings (modsecurity.conf) such as SecRuleEngine,
+# SecRequestBodyAccess, SecAuditEngine, SecDebugLog, and XML processing.
+#
+# The CRS assumes that modsecurity.conf has been loaded. It is bundled with
+# ModSecurity. If you don't have it, you can get it from:
+# 2.x: https://raw.githubusercontent.com/SpiderLabs/ModSecurity/v2/master/modsecurity.conf-recommended
+# 3.x: https://raw.githubusercontent.com/SpiderLabs/ModSecurity/v3/master/modsecurity.conf-recommended
+#
+# The order of file inclusion in your webserver configuration should always be:
+# 1. modsecurity.conf
+# 2. crs-setup.conf (this file)
+# 3. rules/*.conf (the CRS rule files)
+#
+# Please refer to the INSTALL file for detailed installation instructions.
+#
+
+
+#
+# -- [[ Mode of Operation: Anomaly Scoring vs. Self-Contained ]] ---------------
+#
+# The CRS can run in two modes:
+#
+# -- [[ Anomaly Scoring Mode (default) ]] --
+# In CRS3, anomaly mode is the default and recommended mode, since it gives the
+# most accurate log information and offers the most flexibility in setting your
+# blocking policies. It is also called "collaborative detection mode".
+# In this mode, each matching rule increases an 'anomaly score'.
+# At the conclusion of the inbound rules, and again at the conclusion of the
+# outbound rules, the anomaly score is checked, and the blocking evaluation
+# rules apply a disruptive action, by default returning an error 403.
+#
+# -- [[ Self-Contained Mode ]] --
+# In this mode, rules apply an action instantly. This was the CRS2 default.
+# It can lower resource usage, at the cost of less flexibility in blocking policy
+# and less informative audit logs (only the first detected threat is logged).
+# Rules inherit the disruptive action that you specify (i.e. deny, drop, etc).
+# The first rule that matches will execute this action. In most cases this will
+# cause evaluation to stop after the first rule has matched, similar to how many
+# IDSs function.
+#
+# -- [[ Alert Logging Control ]] --
+# In the mode configuration, you must also adjust the desired logging options.
+# There are three common options for dealing with logging. By default CRS enables
+# logging to the webserver error log (or Event viewer) plus detailed logging to
+# the ModSecurity audit log (configured under SecAuditLog in modsecurity.conf).
+#
+# - To log to both error log and ModSecurity audit log file, use: "log,auditlog"
+# - To log *only* to the ModSecurity audit log file, use: "nolog,auditlog"
+# - To log *only* to the error log file, use: "log,noauditlog"
+#
+# Examples for the various modes follow.
+# You must leave one of the following options enabled.
+# Note that you must specify the same line for phase:1 and phase:2.
+#
+
+# Default: Anomaly Scoring mode, log to error log, log to ModSecurity audit log
+# - By default, offending requests are blocked with an error 403 response.
+# - To change the disruptive action, see RESPONSE-999-EXCEPTIONS.conf.example
+#   and review section 'Changing the Disruptive Action for Anomaly Mode'.
+# - In Apache, you can use ErrorDocument to show a friendly error page or
+#   perform a redirect: https://httpd.apache.org/docs/2.4/custom-error.html
+#
+SecDefaultAction "phase:1,log,auditlog,pass"
+SecDefaultAction "phase:2,log,auditlog,pass"
+
+# Example: Anomaly Scoring mode, log only to ModSecurity audit log
+# - By default, offending requests are blocked with an error 403 response.
+# - To change the disruptive action, see RESPONSE-999-EXCEPTIONS.conf.example
+#   and review section 'Changing the Disruptive Action for Anomaly Mode'.
+# - In Apache, you can use ErrorDocument to show a friendly error page or
+#   perform a redirect: https://httpd.apache.org/docs/2.4/custom-error.html
+#
+# SecDefaultAction "phase:1,nolog,auditlog,pass"
+# SecDefaultAction "phase:2,nolog,auditlog,pass"
+
+# Example: Self-contained mode, return error 403 on blocking
+# - In this configuration the default disruptive action becomes 'deny'. After a
+#   rule triggers, it will stop processing the request and return an error 403.
+# - You can also use a different error status, such as 404, 406, et cetera.
+# - In Apache, you can use ErrorDocument to show a friendly error page or
+#   perform a redirect: https://httpd.apache.org/docs/2.4/custom-error.html
+#
+# SecDefaultAction "phase:1,log,auditlog,deny,status:403"
+# SecDefaultAction "phase:2,log,auditlog,deny,status:403"
+
+# Example: Self-contained mode, redirect back to homepage on blocking
+# - In this configuration the 'tag' action includes the Host header data in the
+#   log. This helps to identify which virtual host triggered the rule (if any).
+# - Note that this might cause redirect loops in some situations; for example
+#   if a Cookie or User-Agent header is blocked, it will also be blocked when
+#   the client subsequently tries to access the homepage. You can also redirect
+#   to another custom URL.
+# SecDefaultAction "phase:1,log,auditlog,redirect:'http://%{request_headers.host}/',tag:'Host: %{request_headers.host}'"
+# SecDefaultAction "phase:2,log,auditlog,redirect:'http://%{request_headers.host}/',tag:'Host: %{request_headers.host}'"
+
+
+#
+# -- [[ Paranoia Level Initialization ]] ---------------------------------------
+#
+# The Paranoia Level (PL) setting allows you to choose the desired level
+# of rule checks that will add to your anomaly scores.
+#
+# With each paranoia level increase, the CRS enables additional rules
+# giving you a higher level of security. However, higher paranoia levels
+# also increase the possibility of blocking some legitimate traffic due to
+# false alarms (also named false positives or FPs). If you use higher
+# paranoia levels, it is likely that you will need to add some exclusion
+# rules for certain requests and applications receiving complex input.
+#
+# - A paranoia level of 1 is default. In this level, most core rules
+#   are enabled. PL1 is advised for beginners, installations
+#   covering many different sites and applications, and for setups
+#   with standard security requirements.
+#   At PL1 you should face FPs rarely. If you encounter FPs, please
+#   open an issue on the CRS GitHub site and don't forget to attach your
+#   complete Audit Log record for the request with the issue.
+# - Paranoia level 2 includes many extra rules, for instance enabling
+#   many regexp-based SQL and XSS injection protections, and adding
+#   extra keywords checked for code injections. PL2 is advised
+#   for moderate to experienced users desiring more complete coverage
+#   and for installations with elevated security requirements.
+#   PL2 comes with some FPs which you need to handle.
+# - Paranoia level 3 enables more rules and keyword lists, and tweaks
+#   limits on special characters used. PL3 is aimed at users experienced
+#   at the handling of FPs and at installations with a high security
+#   requirement.
+# - Paranoia level 4 further restricts special characters.
+#   The highest level is advised for experienced users protecting
+#   installations with very high security requirements. Running PL4 will
+#   likely produce a very high number of FPs which have to be
+#   treated before the site can go productive.
+#
+# All rules will log their PL to the audit log;
+# example: [tag "paranoia-level/2"]. This allows you to deduct from the
+# audit log how the WAF behavior is affected by paranoia level.
+#
+# It is important to also look into the variable
+# tx.enforce_bodyproc_urlencoded (Enforce Body Processor URLENCODED)
+# defined below. Enabling it closes a possible bypass of CRS.
+#
+# Uncomment this rule to change the default:
+#
+#SecAction \
+#  "id:900000,\
+#   phase:1,\
+#   nolog,\
+#   pass,\
+#   t:none,\
+#   setvar:tx.paranoia_level=1"
+
+
+# It is possible to execute rules from a higher paranoia level but not include
+# them in the anomaly scoring. This allows you to take a well-tuned system on
+# paranoia level 1 and add rules from paranoia level 2 without having to fear
+# the new rules would lead to false positives that raise your score above the
+# threshold.
+# This optional feature is enabled by uncommenting the following rule and
+# setting the tx.executing_paranoia_level.
+# Technically, rules up to the level defined in tx.executing_paranoia_level
+# will be executed, but only the rules up to tx.paranoia_level affect the
+# anomaly scores.
+# By default, tx.executing_paranoia_level is set to tx.paranoia_level.
+# tx.executing_paranoia_level must not be lower than tx.paranoia_level.
+#
+# Please notice that setting tx.executing_paranoia_level to a higher paranoia
+# level results in a performance impact that is equally high as setting
+# tx.paranoia_level to said level.
+#
+#SecAction \
+#  "id:900001,\
+#   phase:1,\
+#   nolog,\
+#   pass,\
+#   t:none,\
+#   setvar:tx.executing_paranoia_level=1"
+
+
+#
+# -- [[ Enforce Body Processor URLENCODED ]] -----------------------------------
+#
+# ModSecurity selects the body processor based on the Content-Type request
+# header. But clients are not always setting the Content-Type header for their
+# request body payloads. This will leave ModSecurity with limited vision into
+# the payload.  The variable tx.enforce_bodyproc_urlencoded lets you force the
+# URLENCODED body processor in these situations. This is off by default, as it
+# implies a change of the behaviour of ModSecurity beyond CRS (the body
+# processor applies to all rules, not only CRS) and because it may lead to
+# false positives already on paranoia level 1. However, enabling this variable
+# closes a possible bypass of CRS so it should be considered.
+#
+# Uncomment this rule to change the default:
+#
+#SecAction \
+#  "id:900010,\
+#   phase:1,\
+#   nolog,\
+#   pass,\
+#   t:none,\
+#   setvar:tx.enforce_bodyproc_urlencoded=1"
+
+
+#
+# -- [[ Anomaly Mode Severity Levels ]] ----------------------------------------
+#
+# Each rule in the CRS has an associated severity level.
+# These are the default scoring points for each severity level.
+# These settings will be used to increment the anomaly score if a rule matches.
+# You may adjust these points to your liking, but this is usually not needed.
+#
+# - CRITICAL severity: Anomaly Score of 5.
+#       Mostly generated by the application attack rules (93x and 94x files).
+# - ERROR severity: Anomaly Score of 4.
+#       Generated mostly from outbound leakage rules (95x files).
+# - WARNING severity: Anomaly Score of 3.
+#       Generated mostly by malicious client rules (91x files).
+# - NOTICE severity: Anomaly Score of 2.
+#       Generated mostly by the protocol rules (92x files).
+#
+# In anomaly mode, these scores are cumulative.
+# So it's possible for a request to hit multiple rules.
+#
+# (Note: In this file, we use 'phase:1' to set CRS configuration variables.
+# In general, 'phase:request' is used. However, we want to make absolutely sure
+# that all configuration variables are set before the CRS rules are processed.)
+#
+#SecAction \
+# "id:900100,\
+#  phase:1,\
+#  nolog,\
+#  pass,\
+#  t:none,\
+#  setvar:tx.critical_anomaly_score=5,\
+#  setvar:tx.error_anomaly_score=4,\
+#  setvar:tx.warning_anomaly_score=3,\
+#  setvar:tx.notice_anomaly_score=2"
+
+
+#
+# -- [[ Anomaly Mode Blocking Threshold Levels ]] ------------------------------
+#
+# Here, you can specify at which cumulative anomaly score an inbound request,
+# or outbound response, gets blocked.
+#
+# Most detected inbound threats will give a critical score of 5.
+# Smaller violations, like violations of protocol/standards, carry lower scores.
+#
+# [ At default value ]
+# If you keep the blocking thresholds at the defaults, the CRS will work
+# similarly to previous CRS versions: a single critical rule match will cause
+# the request to be blocked and logged.
+#
+# [ Using higher values ]
+# If you want to make the CRS less sensitive, you can increase the blocking
+# thresholds, for instance to 7 (which would require multiple rule matches
+# before blocking) or 10 (which would require at least two critical alerts - or
+# a combination of many lesser alerts), or even higher. However, increasing the
+# thresholds might cause some attacks to bypass the CRS rules or your policies.
+#
+# [ New deployment strategy: Starting high and decreasing ]
+# It is a common practice to start a fresh CRS installation with elevated
+# anomaly scoring thresholds (>100) and then lower the limits as your
+# confidence in the setup grows. You may also look into the Sampling
+# Percentage section below for a different strategy to ease into a new
+# CRS installation.
+#
+# [ Anomaly Threshold / Paranoia Level Quadrant ]
+#
+#     High Anomaly Limit   |   High Anomaly Limit
+#     Low Paranoia Level   |   High Paranoia Level
+#     -> Fresh Site        |   -> Experimental Site
+# ------------------------------------------------------
+#     Low Anomaly Limit    |   Low Anomaly Limit
+#     Low Paranoia Level   |   High Paranoia Level
+#     -> Standard Site     |   -> High Security Site
+#
+# Uncomment this rule to change the defaults:
+#
+#SecAction \
+# "id:900110,\
+#  phase:1,\
+#  nolog,\
+#  pass,\
+#  t:none,\
+#  setvar:tx.inbound_anomaly_score_threshold=5,\
+#  setvar:tx.outbound_anomaly_score_threshold=4"
+
+#
+# -- [[ Application Specific Rule Exclusions ]] ----------------------------------------
+#
+# Some well-known applications may undertake actions that appear to be
+# malicious. This includes actions such as allowing HTML or Javascript within
+# parameters. In such cases the CRS aims to prevent false positives by allowing
+# administrators to enable prebuilt, application specific exclusions on an
+# application by application basis.
+# These application specific exclusions are distinct from the rules that would
+# be placed in the REQUEST-900-EXCLUSION-RULES-BEFORE-CRS configuration file as
+# they are prebuilt for specific applications. The 'REQUEST-900' file is
+# designed for users to add their own custom exclusions. Note, using these
+# application specific exclusions may loosen restrictions of the CRS,
+# especially if used with an application they weren't designed for. As a result
+# they should be applied with care.
+# To use this functionality you must specify a supported application. To do so
+# uncomment rule 900130. In addition to uncommenting the rule you will need to
+# specify which application(s) you'd like to enable exclusions for. Only a
+# (very) limited set of applications are currently supported, please use the
+# filenames prefixed with 'REQUEST-903' to guide you in your selection.
+# Such filenames use the following convention:
+# REQUEST-903.9XXX-{APPNAME}-EXCLUSIONS-RULES.conf
+#
+# It is recommended if you run multiple web applications on your site to limit
+# the effects of the exclusion to only the path where the excluded webapp
+# resides using a rule similar to the following example:
+# SecRule REQUEST_URI "@beginsWith /wordpress/" setvar:tx.crs_exclusions_wordpress=1
+
+#
+# Modify and uncomment this rule to select which application:
+#
+SecAction \
+ "id:900130,\
+  phase:1,\
+  nolog,\
+  pass,\
+  t:none,\
+  setvar:tx.crs_exclusions_nextcloud=1,\
+  setvar:tx.crs_exclusions_wordpress=1"
+#  setvar:tx.crs_exclusions_cpanel=1,\
+#  setvar:tx.crs_exclusions_drupal=1,\
+#  setvar:tx.crs_exclusions_dokuwiki=1,\
+#  setvar:tx.crs_exclusions_xenforo=1"
+
+#
+# -- [[ HTTP Policy Settings ]] ------------------------------------------------
+#
+# This section defines your policies for the HTTP protocol, such as:
+# - allowed HTTP versions, HTTP methods, allowed request Content-Types
+# - forbidden file extensions (e.g. .bak, .sql) and request headers (e.g. Proxy)
+#
+# These variables are used in the following rule files:
+# - REQUEST-911-METHOD-ENFORCEMENT.conf
+# - REQUEST-912-DOS-PROTECTION.conf
+# - REQUEST-920-PROTOCOL-ENFORCEMENT.conf
+
+# HTTP methods that a client is allowed to use.
+# Default: GET HEAD POST OPTIONS
+# Example: for RESTful APIs, add the following methods: PUT PATCH DELETE
+# Example: for WebDAV, add the following methods: CHECKOUT COPY DELETE LOCK
+#          MERGE MKACTIVITY MKCOL MOVE PROPFIND PROPPATCH PUT UNLOCK
+# Uncomment this rule to change the default.
+#SecAction \
+# "id:900200,\
+#  phase:1,\
+#  nolog,\
+#  pass,\
+#  t:none,\
+#  setvar:'tx.allowed_methods=GET HEAD POST OPTIONS'"
+
+# Content-Types that a client is allowed to send in a request.
+# Default: |application/x-www-form-urlencoded| |multipart/form-data| |multipart/related|
+# |text/xml| |application/xml| |application/soap+xml| |application/x-amf| |application/json|
+# |application/octet-stream| |application/csp-report| |application/xss-auditor-report| |text/plain|
+# Uncomment this rule to change the default.
+#SecAction \
+# "id:900220,\
+#  phase:1,\
+#  nolog,\
+#  pass,\
+#  t:none,\
+#  setvar:'tx.allowed_request_content_type=|application/x-www-form-urlencoded| |multipart/form-data| |multipart/related| |text/xml| |application/xml| |application/soap+xml| |application/x-amf| |application/json| |application/octet-stream| |application/csp-report| |application/xss-auditor-report| |text/plain|'"
+
+# Allowed HTTP versions.
+# Default: HTTP/1.0 HTTP/1.1 HTTP/2 HTTP/2.0
+# Example for legacy clients: HTTP/0.9 HTTP/1.0 HTTP/1.1 HTTP/2 HTTP/2.0
+# Note that some web server versions use 'HTTP/2', some 'HTTP/2.0', so
+# we include both version strings by default.
+# Uncomment this rule to change the default.
+#SecAction \
+# "id:900230,\
+#  phase:1,\
+#  nolog,\
+#  pass,\
+#  t:none,\
+#  setvar:'tx.allowed_http_versions=HTTP/1.0 HTTP/1.1 HTTP/2 HTTP/2.0'"
+
+# Forbidden file extensions.
+# Guards against unintended exposure of development/configuration files.
+# Default: .asa/ .asax/ .ascx/ .axd/ .backup/ .bak/ .bat/ .cdx/ .cer/ .cfg/ .cmd/ .com/ .config/ .conf/ .cs/ .csproj/ .csr/ .dat/ .db/ .dbf/ .dll/ .dos/ .htr/ .htw/ .ida/ .idc/ .idq/ .inc/ .ini/ .key/ .licx/ .lnk/ .log/ .mdb/ .old/ .pass/ .pdb/ .pol/ .printer/ .pwd/ .rdb/ .resources/ .resx/ .sql/ .swp/ .sys/ .vb/ .vbs/ .vbproj/ .vsdisco/ .webinfo/ .xsd/ .xsx/
+# Example: .bak/ .config/ .conf/ .db/ .ini/ .log/ .old/ .pass/ .pdb/ .rdb/ .sql/
+# Uncomment this rule to change the default.
+#SecAction \
+# "id:900240,\
+#  phase:1,\
+#  nolog,\
+#  pass,\
+#  t:none,\
+#  setvar:'tx.restricted_extensions=.asa/ .asax/ .ascx/ .axd/ .backup/ .bak/ .bat/ .cdx/ .cer/ .cfg/ .cmd/ .com/ .config/ .conf/ .cs/ .csproj/ .csr/ .dat/ .db/ .dbf/ .dll/ .dos/ .htr/ .htw/ .ida/ .idc/ .idq/ .inc/ .ini/ .key/ .licx/ .lnk/ .log/ .mdb/ .old/ .pass/ .pdb/ .pol/ .printer/ .pwd/ .rdb/ .resources/ .resx/ .sql/ .swp/ .sys/ .vb/ .vbs/ .vbproj/ .vsdisco/ .webinfo/ .xsd/ .xsx/'"
+
+# Forbidden request headers.
+# Header names should be lowercase, enclosed by /slashes/ as delimiters.
+# Blocking Proxy header prevents 'httpoxy' vulnerability: https://httpoxy.org
+# Default: /proxy/ /lock-token/ /content-range/ /if/
+# Uncomment this rule to change the default.
+#SecAction \
+# "id:900250,\
+#  phase:1,\
+#  nolog,\
+#  pass,\
+#  t:none,\
+#  setvar:'tx.restricted_headers=/proxy/ /lock-token/ /content-range/ /if/'"
+
+# File extensions considered static files.
+# Extensions include the dot, lowercase, enclosed by /slashes/ as delimiters.
+# Used in DoS protection rule. See section "Anti-Automation / DoS Protection".
+# Default: /.jpg/ /.jpeg/ /.png/ /.gif/ /.js/ /.css/ /.ico/ /.svg/ /.webp/
+# Uncomment this rule to change the default.
+#SecAction \
+# "id:900260,\
+#  phase:1,\
+#  nolog,\
+#  pass,\
+#  t:none,\
+#  setvar:'tx.static_extensions=/.jpg/ /.jpeg/ /.png/ /.gif/ /.js/ /.css/ /.ico/ /.svg/ /.webp/'"
+
+# Content-Types charsets that a client is allowed to send in a request.
+# Default: utf-8|iso-8859-1|iso-8859-15|windows-1252
+# Uncomment this rule to change the default.
+# Use "|" to separate multiple charsets like in the rule defining
+# tx.allowed_request_content_type.
+#SecAction \
+# "id:900280,\
+#  phase:1,\
+#  nolog,\
+#  pass,\
+#  t:none,\
+#  setvar:'tx.allowed_request_content_type_charset=utf-8|iso-8859-1|iso-8859-15|windows-1252'"
+
+#
+# -- [[ HTTP Argument/Upload Limits ]] -----------------------------------------
+#
+# Here you can define optional limits on HTTP get/post parameters and uploads.
+# This can help to prevent application specific DoS attacks.
+#
+# These values are checked in REQUEST-920-PROTOCOL-ENFORCEMENT.conf.
+# Beware of blocking legitimate traffic when enabling these limits.
+#
+
+# Block request if number of arguments is too high
+# Default: unlimited
+# Example: 255
+# Uncomment this rule to set a limit.
+#SecAction \
+# "id:900300,\
+#  phase:1,\
+#  nolog,\
+#  pass,\
+#  t:none,\
+#  setvar:tx.max_num_args=255"
+
+# Block request if the length of any argument name is too high
+# Default: unlimited
+# Example: 100
+# Uncomment this rule to set a limit.
+#SecAction \
+# "id:900310,\
+#  phase:1,\
+#  nolog,\
+#  pass,\
+#  t:none,\
+#  setvar:tx.arg_name_length=100"
+
+# Block request if the length of any argument value is too high
+# Default: unlimited
+# Example: 400
+# Uncomment this rule to set a limit.
+#SecAction \
+# "id:900320,\
+#  phase:1,\
+#  nolog,\
+#  pass,\
+#  t:none,\
+#  setvar:tx.arg_length=400"
+
+# Block request if the total length of all combined arguments is too high
+# Default: unlimited
+# Example: 64000
+# Uncomment this rule to set a limit.
+#SecAction \
+# "id:900330,\
+#  phase:1,\
+#  nolog,\
+#  pass,\
+#  t:none,\
+#  setvar:tx.total_arg_length=64000"
+
+# Block request if the file size of any individual uploaded file is too high
+# Default: unlimited
+# Example: 1048576
+# Uncomment this rule to set a limit.
+#SecAction \
+# "id:900340,\
+#  phase:1,\
+#  nolog,\
+#  pass,\
+#  t:none,\
+#  setvar:tx.max_file_size=1048576"
+
+# Block request if the total size of all combined uploaded files is too high
+# Default: unlimited
+# Example: 1048576
+# Uncomment this rule to set a limit.
+#SecAction \
+# "id:900350,\
+#  phase:1,\
+#  nolog,\
+#  pass,\
+#  t:none,\
+#  setvar:tx.combined_file_sizes=1048576"
+
+
+#
+# -- [[ Easing In / Sampling Percentage ]] -------------------------------------
+#
+# Adding the Core Rule Set to an existing productive site can lead to false
+# positives, unexpected performance issues and other undesired side effects.
+#
+# It can be beneficial to test the water first by enabling the CRS for a
+# limited number of requests only and then, when you have solved the issues (if
+# any) and you have confidence in the setup, to raise the ratio of requests
+# being sent into the ruleset.
+#
+# Adjust the percentage of requests that are funnelled into the Core Rules by
+# setting TX.sampling_percentage below. The default is 100, meaning that every
+# request gets checked by the CRS.  The selection of requests, which are going
+# to be checked, is based on a pseudo random number generated by ModSecurity.
+#
+# If a request is allowed to pass without being checked by the CRS, there is no
+# entry in the audit log (for performance reasons), but an error log entry is
+# written.  If you want to disable the error log entry, then issue the
+# following directive somewhere after the inclusion of the CRS
+# (E.g., RESPONSE-999-EXCEPTIONS.conf).
+#
+# SecRuleUpdateActionById 901150 "nolog"
+#
+# ATTENTION: If this TX.sampling_percentage is below 100, then some of the
+# requests will bypass the Core Rules completely and you lose the ability to
+# protect your service with ModSecurity.
+#
+# Uncomment this rule to enable this feature:
+#
+#SecAction "id:900400,\
+#  phase:1,\
+#  pass,\
+#  nolog,\
+#  setvar:tx.sampling_percentage=100"
+
+
+#
+# -- [[ Project Honey Pot HTTP Blacklist ]] ------------------------------------
+#
+# Optionally, you can check the client IP address against the Project Honey Pot
+# HTTPBL (dnsbl.httpbl.org). In order to use this, you need to register to get a
+# free API key. Set it here with SecHttpBlKey.
+#
+# Project Honeypot returns multiple different malicious IP types.
+# You may specify which you want to block by enabling or disabling them below.
+#
+# Ref: https://www.projecthoneypot.org/httpbl.php
+# Ref: https://github.com/SpiderLabs/ModSecurity/wiki/Reference-Manual#wiki-SecHttpBlKey
+#
+# Uncomment these rules to use this feature:
+#
+#SecHttpBlKey XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
+#SecAction "id:900500,\
+#  phase:1,\
+#  nolog,\
+#  pass,\
+#  t:none,\
+#  setvar:tx.block_search_ip=1,\
+#  setvar:tx.block_suspicious_ip=1,\
+#  setvar:tx.block_harvester_ip=1,\
+#  setvar:tx.block_spammer_ip=1"
+
+
+#
+# -- [[ GeoIP Database ]] ------------------------------------------------------
+#
+# There are some rulesets that inspect geolocation data of the client IP address
+# (geoLookup). The CRS uses geoLookup to implement optional country blocking.
+#
+# To use geolocation, we make use of the MaxMind GeoIP database.
+# This database is not included with the CRS and must be downloaded.
+#
+# There are two formats for the GeoIP database. ModSecurity v2 uses GeoLite (.dat files),
+# and ModSecurity v3 uses GeoLite2 (.mmdb files).
+#
+# If you use ModSecurity 3, MaxMind provides a binary for updating GeoLite2 files,
+# see https://github.com/maxmind/geoipupdate.
+#
+# Download the package for your OS, and read https://dev.maxmind.com/geoip/geoipupdate/
+# for configuration options.
+#
+# Warning: GeoLite (not GeoLite2) databases are considered legacy, and not being updated anymore.
+# See https://support.maxmind.com/geolite-legacy-discontinuation-notice/ for more info.
+#
+# Therefore, if you use ModSecurity v2, you need to regenerate updated .dat files
+# from CSV files first.
+#
+# You can achieve this using https://github.com/sherpya/geolite2legacy
+# Pick the zip files from maxmind site:
+# https://geolite.maxmind.com/download/geoip/database/GeoLite2-Country-CSV.zip
+#
+# Follow the guidelines for installing the tool and run:
+# ./geolite2legacy.py -i GeoLite2-Country-CSV.zip \
+#                     -f geoname2fips.csv -o /usr/share/GeoliteCountry.dat
+#
+# Update the database regularly, see Step 3 of the configuration link above.
+#
+# By default, when you execute `sudo geoipupdate` on Linux, files from the free database
+# will be downloaded to `/usr/share/GeoIP` (both v1 and v2).
+#
+# Then choose from:
+#   - `GeoLite2-Country.mmdb` (if you are using ModSecurity v3)
+#   - `GeoLiteCountry.dat`    (if you are using ModSecurity v2)
+#
+# Ref: http://blog.spiderlabs.com/2010/10/detecting-malice-with-modsecurity-geolocation-data.html
+# Ref: http://blog.spiderlabs.com/2010/11/detecting-malice-with-modsecurity-ip-forensics.html
+#
+# Uncomment only one of the next rules here to use this feature.
+# Choose the one depending on the ModSecurity version you are using, and change the path accordingly:
+#
+# For ModSecurity v3:
+#SecGeoLookupDB /usr/share/GeoIP/GeoLite2-Country.mmdb
+# For ModSecurity v2 (points to the converted one):
+#SecGeoLookupDB /usr/share/GeoIP/GeoLiteCountry.dat
+
+#
+# -=[ Block Countries ]=-
+#
+# Rules in the IP Reputation file can check the client against a list of high
+# risk country codes. These countries have to be defined in the variable
+# tx.high_risk_country_codes via their ISO 3166 two-letter country code:
+# https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ISO_3166-1_alpha-2#Officially_assigned_code_elements
+#
+# If you are sure that you are not getting any legitimate requests from a given
+# country, then you can disable all access from that country via this variable.
+# The rule performing the test has the rule id 910100.
+#
+# This rule requires SecGeoLookupDB to be enabled and the GeoIP database to be
+# downloaded (see the section "GeoIP Database" above.)
+#
+# By default, the list is empty. A list used by some sites was the following:
+# setvar:'tx.high_risk_country_codes=UA ID YU LT EG RO BG TR RU PK MY CN'"
+#
+# Uncomment this rule to use this feature:
+#
+#SecAction \
+# "id:900600,\
+#  phase:1,\
+#  nolog,\
+#  pass,\
+#  t:none,\
+#  setvar:'tx.high_risk_country_codes='"
+
+
+#
+# -- [[ Anti-Automation / DoS Protection ]] ------------------------------------
+#
+# Optional DoS protection against clients making requests too quickly.
+#
+# When a client is making more than 100 requests (excluding static files) within
+# 60 seconds, this is considered a 'burst'. After two bursts, the client is
+# blocked for 600 seconds.
+#
+# Requests to static files are not counted towards DoS; they are listed in the
+# 'tx.static_extensions' setting, which you can change in this file (see
+# section "HTTP Policy Settings").
+#
+# For a detailed description, see rule file REQUEST-912-DOS-PROTECTION.conf.
+#
+# Uncomment this rule to use this feature:
+#
+#SecAction \
+# "id:900700,\
+#  phase:1,\
+#  nolog,\
+#  pass,\
+#  t:none,\
+#  setvar:'tx.dos_burst_time_slice=60',\
+#  setvar:'tx.dos_counter_threshold=100',\
+#  setvar:'tx.dos_block_timeout=600'"
+
+
+#
+# -- [[ Check UTF-8 encoding ]] ------------------------------------------------
+#
+# The CRS can optionally check request contents for invalid UTF-8 encoding.
+# We only want to apply this check if UTF-8 encoding is actually used by the
+# site; otherwise it will result in false positives.
+#
+# Uncomment this rule to use this feature:
+#
+#SecAction \
+# "id:900950,\
+#  phase:1,\
+#  nolog,\
+#  pass,\
+#  t:none,\
+#  setvar:tx.crs_validate_utf8_encoding=1"
+
+
+#
+# -- [[ Blocking Based on IP Reputation ]] ------------------------------------
+#
+# Blocking based on reputation is permanent in the CRS. Unlike other rules,
+# which look at the individual request, the blocking of IPs is based on
+# a persistent record in the IP collection, which remains active for a
+# certain amount of time.
+#
+# There are two ways an individual client can become flagged for blocking:
+# - External information (RBL, GeoIP, etc.)
+# - Internal information (Core Rules)
+#
+# The record in the IP collection carries a flag, which tags requests from
+# individual clients with a flag named IP.reput_block_flag.
+# But the flag alone is not enough to have a client blocked. There is also
+# a global switch named tx.do_reput_block. This is off by default. If you set
+# it to 1 (=On), requests from clients with the IP.reput_block_flag will
+# be blocked for a certain duration.
+#
+# Variables
+# ip.reput_block_flag      Blocking flag for the IP collection record
+# ip.reput_block_reason    Reason (= rule message) that caused to blocking flag
+# tx.do_reput_block        Switch deciding if we really block based on flag
+# tx.reput_block_duration  Setting to define the duration of a block
+#
+# It may be important to know, that all the other core rules are skipped for
+# requests, when it is clear that they carry the blocking flag in question.
+#
+# Uncomment this rule to use this feature:
+#
+#SecAction \
+# "id:900960,\
+#  phase:1,\
+#  nolog,\
+#  pass,\
+#  t:none,\
+#  setvar:tx.do_reput_block=1"
+#
+# Uncomment this rule to change the blocking time:
+# Default: 300 (5 minutes)
+#
+#SecAction \
+# "id:900970,\
+#  phase:1,\
+#  nolog,\
+#  pass,\
+#  t:none,\
+#  setvar:tx.reput_block_duration=300"
+
+
+#
+# -- [[ Collection timeout ]] --------------------------------------------------
+#
+# Set the SecCollectionTimeout directive from the ModSecurity default (1 hour)
+# to a lower setting which is appropriate to most sites.
+# This increases performance by cleaning out stale collection (block) entries.
+#
+# This value should be greater than or equal to:
+# tx.reput_block_duration (see section "Blocking Based on IP Reputation") and
+# tx.dos_block_timeout (see section "Anti-Automation / DoS Protection").
+#
+# Ref: https://github.com/SpiderLabs/ModSecurity/wiki/Reference-Manual#wiki-SecCollectionTimeout
+
+# Please keep this directive uncommented.
+# Default: 600 (10 minutes)
+SecCollectionTimeout 600
+
+
+#
+# -- [[ End of setup ]] --------------------------------------------------------
+#
+# The CRS checks the tx.crs_setup_version variable to ensure that the setup
+# has been loaded. If you are not planning to use this setup template,
+# you must manually set the tx.crs_setup_version variable before including
+# the CRS rules/* files.
+#
+# The variable is a numerical representation of the CRS version number.
+# E.g., v3.0.0 is represented as 300.
+#
+SecAction \
+ "id:900990,\
+  phase:1,\
+  nolog,\
+  pass,\
+  t:none,\
+  setvar:tx.crs_setup_version=320"
diff --git a/dd-waf/docker/modsecurity/letsencrypt-hook-deploy-concatenante.sh b/dd-waf/docker/modsecurity/letsencrypt-hook-deploy-concatenante.sh
deleted file mode 100755
index 3b3fc34..0000000
--- a/dd-waf/docker/modsecurity/letsencrypt-hook-deploy-concatenante.sh
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,23 +0,0 @@
-#!/bin/sh
-#
-#   Copyright © 2021,2022 IsardVDI S.L.
-#
-#   This file is part of DD
-#
-#   DD is free software: you can redistribute it and/or modify
-#   it under the terms of the GNU Affero General Public License as published by
-#   the Free Software Foundation, either version 3 of the License, or (at your
-#   option) any later version.
-#
-#   DD is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, but WITHOUT ANY
-#   WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS
-#   FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the GNU Affero General Public License for more
-#   details.
-#
-#   You should have received a copy of the GNU Affero General Public License
-#   along with DD. If not, see <https://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
-#
-# SPDX-License-Identifier: AGPL-3.0-or-later
-cat $RENEWED_LINEAGE/fullchain.pem $RENEWED_LINEAGE/privkey.pem > /certs/chain.pem
-
-kill -SIGUSR2 1
diff --git a/dd-waf/docker/modsecurity/letsencrypt-renew-cron.sh b/dd-waf/docker/modsecurity/letsencrypt-renew-cron.sh
deleted file mode 100755
index 486d64a..0000000
--- a/dd-waf/docker/modsecurity/letsencrypt-renew-cron.sh
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,21 +0,0 @@
-#!/bin/sh
-#
-#   Copyright © 2021,2022 IsardVDI S.L.
-#
-#   This file is part of DD
-#
-#   DD is free software: you can redistribute it and/or modify
-#   it under the terms of the GNU Affero General Public License as published by
-#   the Free Software Foundation, either version 3 of the License, or (at your
-#   option) any later version.
-#
-#   DD is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, but WITHOUT ANY
-#   WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS
-#   FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the GNU Affero General Public License for more
-#   details.
-#
-#   You should have received a copy of the GNU Affero General Public License
-#   along with DD. If not, see <https://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
-#
-# SPDX-License-Identifier: AGPL-3.0-or-later
-certbot renew --http-01-port 8080 --cert-name sso.$LETSENCRYPT_DOMAIN
diff --git a/dd-waf/docker/modsecurity/letsencrypt.sh b/dd-waf/docker/modsecurity/letsencrypt.sh
deleted file mode 100755
index 5a524cb..0000000
--- a/dd-waf/docker/modsecurity/letsencrypt.sh
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,50 +0,0 @@
-#!/bin/sh
-#
-#   Copyright © 2021,2022 IsardVDI S.L.
-#
-#   This file is part of DD
-#
-#   DD is free software: you can redistribute it and/or modify
-#   it under the terms of the GNU Affero General Public License as published by
-#   the Free Software Foundation, either version 3 of the License, or (at your
-#   option) any later version.
-#
-#   DD is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, but WITHOUT ANY
-#   WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS
-#   FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the GNU Affero General Public License for more
-#   details.
-#
-#   You should have received a copy of the GNU Affero General Public License
-#   along with DD. If not, see <https://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
-#
-# SPDX-License-Identifier: AGPL-3.0-or-later
-if [ ! -L /etc/letsencrypt/renewal-hooks/deploy/letsencrypt-hook-deploy-concatenante.sh ]
-then
-  mkdir -p /etc/letsencrypt/renewal-hooks/deploy/
-  ln -s /usr/local/sbin/letsencrypt-hook-deploy-concatenante.sh /etc/letsencrypt/renewal-hooks/deploy/
-fi
-
-if [ -n "$LETSENCRYPT_DOMAIN" -a -n "$LETSENCRYPT_EMAIL" ]
-then
-  LETSENCRYPT_DOMAIN="$LETSENCRYPT_DOMAIN" crond
-  if [ "$LETSENCRYPT_DOMAIN_ROOT" == "true" ]
-  then
-    option_root_domain="-d $LETSENCRYPT_DOMAIN"
-  fi
-  if [ ! -f /certs/chain.pem ]
-  then
-    if certbot certonly --standalone -m "$LETSENCRYPT_EMAIL" -n --agree-tos --apache --redirect --uir --hsts --staple-ocsp --must-staple\
-      -d "sso.$LETSENCRYPT_DOMAIN" \
-      -d "api.$LETSENCRYPT_DOMAIN" \
-      -d "admin.$LETSENCRYPT_DOMAIN" \
-      -d "moodle.$LETSENCRYPT_DOMAIN" \
-      -d "nextcloud.$LETSENCRYPT_DOMAIN" \
-      -d "wp.$LETSENCRYPT_DOMAIN" \
-      -d "oof.$LETSENCRYPT_DOMAIN" \
-      -d "pad.$LETSENCRYPT_DOMAIN" \
-      $option_root_domain
-    then
-      RENEWED_LINEAGE="/etc/letsencrypt/live/sso.$LETSENCRYPT_DOMAIN" /etc/letsencrypt/renewal-hooks/deploy/letsencrypt-hook-deploy-concatenante.sh
-    fi
-  fi
-fi
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/dd-waf/docker/modsecurity/modsec_rules.conf b/dd-waf/docker/modsecurity/modsec_rules.conf
index 51d7cf6..eb53ad4 100644
--- a/dd-waf/docker/modsecurity/modsec_rules.conf
+++ b/dd-waf/docker/modsecurity/modsec_rules.conf
@@ -1,3 +1,4 @@
 Include "/etc/apache2/modsecurity.d/modsecurity.conf"
 Include "/etc/apache2/modsecurity.d/owasp-crs/crs-setup.conf"
 Include "/etc/apache2/modsecurity.d/owasp-crs/rules/*.conf"
+Include "/etc/apache2/modsecurity.d/dd-rules.conf"
\ No newline at end of file